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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

REPORT NO INFORMATION FROM

COUNTRY USSR and Satellites

DATE OF INFORMATION 8 - 25 June 1949

SUBJECT

SOVIET AND SATELLITE FADIO COMMENT ABOUT THE

CFM SESSIONS IN PARIS

DATE DIST. / J to 1949

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THE OFFICENT IN ANY MANURE TO AN UNADTHOUSE THE REPLICATION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE (This strictly factual report is based solely on monitored foreign by adcasts received in Washington up to 7 a.m., 10 June 1949. It reproduces a report prepared in response to a special request.)

INTERDUCTION: Coincident with the CFM reversion to open sessions, the Soviet radio (and to a lesser extent, its Satellites) returns to voluminous reports on the Conférer e proceedings, with primary attention given the speeches by Vishinsky. Since Report No. 4 of this series, Radio Moscow and the Soviet-controlled German radios have also issued a number of commentaries on CFM-related subjects. Perhaps the most interesting statements are the several broadcast allusions to the possible Conference outcome -- ranging from hopes of at least a limited agreement of some kind to charges that the Western Powers have no intention of reaching an agreement or of compremising in any way. Otherwise, the commentaries generally constitute a recapitulation of previously expressed Soviet positions on such issues as the Berlin question, the unsuimity principle, and the Bonn Constitution. Two Soviet commentaries are concerned with the alleged failure of demilitarization in Western Germany, a subject that has been generall; slighted throughout the course of this Conference. References to the need for German unity continue to appear, but-except for one review of the German Peoples Congress struggle for emity and a just peace"-not in concentrated form. The claim that because of the economic samp the Western delegates are only interested in a limited trade agreement -- as reported by Yuri Zhukov in PRAVEA a few days ago -- is not pursued; but in other contexts, Moscow repeats the statement about desirability of East-West trade and accuses the Western Powers of "ousting Western German products from the markets of the world.

LINITED ACREPACITY: FUTURE CONTACTS: The most emusual statements regarding the possible outcome of the Conference are broadcast not by Soviet or Soviet-controlled radios but by the U.S. licensed and British-licensed press services in Germany. Because they are attributed to official Soviet sources, however, they appear to be worth reporting here. The despatch by the U.S.-licensed agency reports:

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"Major General Tulpanov, Soviet Mili ary Administration Information Chief, this representatives of the Soviet-Dicensed press in Berlin yesterday that the Societ delegation expected the Foreign Ministers Generales to and without having achieved any regitive results. According to German Strains alose to the Soviet Military Administration, Pulpanov also empounded that the Soviet delegation would now try to obtain a short-to in trade same ment to restore the free exchange of goods between Eastern and Western Germany and between Eastern and Western Berlin." (O Jone)

According to the dispatch by the Brilliah-Licensed agency:

"It is said that members of the Soviet delegation who had already returned to Raminorat stated that the end of the Paris Foreign Ministers Conference did not mean to end of the recently resumed contact between the Four Fig Powers. The end of the Paris conference would mean the beginning of a series of conferences from which Moscow would will expect success." (8 June)

And Schmitzler, Saviet-controlled Samuer commentator, says that although German depends 'go further than Vishinsky's proposals "w the Germans "wholeseartedly welcome even the sest me dest agreements."

THE "ACCIDANTIAN" SOVIET ATTITUDE: At least one Soviet commentary and two Soviet controlled German commentaries go out of their way to portray the Soviet position as one that is characterized by good will, a willingness to compresse, and a desire to arrive at a reasonable agreement. At the end of discussion of the Berlin question, Soviet commentator Lemin, adding a "few words about good will and an uncompromising attitude." contends that "the Soviet proposals reflect a desire to ecoperate with the Western Powers. The USSR does not seek to secure any privilege for itself, and does not intend to place itself in a special position." Budzislawski Soviet-controlled Leipzig commentator, claims that there is no question about "which party has rewored conciliation in these discussions. ... Vishinsky had never claimed that his proposals were the Soviets' last word. ... In view of this accommodating attitude, it is really difficult to find a concrete reason for a negative conclusion of the Conference." And Schritzler, (dvising that "compromise proposals are necessary," observes that "the USSR's proposals...are gives to the limit of a possible compromise without leaving the principles laid down at the Waysas conference."

WESTERN "DIGITATION": "SYSTEMATIC FAIL BE. SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED": Conciliatory statements. such as the above, however, are not permitted to stand by themselves. Each of the is fullowed by a comparison with the Western delegates! "dictatorial attitude," with "Acheson's arrogant demands," with the alleged Western plan to oppose uncompromisingly "anything which Yishinsky might submit." The latter charges are much more frequent than protestations of Saviet willingness to agree; and Soviet commentators even pick up the thesis, first voiced by Budapes t, that the Western proposals were presented with the deliberate intention of being rejected by the NSSR. Commentator Tzakov, for example, says that "in submitting their obviously unacceptable proposals, the Western Powers did not at all melieve that they would be adopted." And another Scylet commentator, attacking the Voice of America end the Western press for trying to cinvince their audiences that the success of the Conference depends on the attitude of the Soviet delegation, repeats essentially the same contention -- which is said to have clearly revealed the hyporrisy of the Western proposals and propagazaia about a united Germany. In addition to the reval metives ascribed to Western attempts at "dictation." the Soviet-controlled German radios sed a new one. Reporting an article in TARGLIGHE RUNG GRAU (Soviet Military Administration organ). Sovietcontrolled Berlin claims that "Secretor Commaily stated ... that a breakdown of the Foreign Ministers Conference would lead to a speeding up of the decision on the U.S. military aid program for Europe amounting to 1.3 billion dollars. This is the crux of the matter. The U.S. is looking for markets and cammonfielder in Europe, but not for peace and understatining." And a Soviet-controlled Leipzig commentator charges that the Western attitude is modificated by a desire to preserve an atmosphere of coefficient-"because the beginning of a slump is the Western world, and especially the U.S., makes it ever more necessary to grant financial aid to the U.S. armament kings by giving them orders for new arms; and the climate most conducive to ... the amements industry is the junely atmosphere of conflict."

 2 The most outright Soviet-controlled German statement to this effect that has been monitored to date.

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